Thin political markets arise in areas where the issues have low salience to the general public and special interests have tacit knowledge that is relevant to policy. How might policy outcomes get distorted in these thin political markets? What are the incentives of experts, including those from academia, when they participate in policymaking? How can we mitigate special-interest capture?

Professor Paul Pfleiderer, of Stanford GSB moderates a panel discussion with Karthik Ramanna of the University of Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, the Honorable Sarah Bloom Raskin of Duke University School of Law, and Professor Tommaso Valletti of Imperial College London. The panelists are joined by additional discussants journalist Martin Wolf of the Financial Times and Professor Rebecca Henderson of Harvard Business School.

This is Session 3 of the Corporations and Democracy Conference, December 7-9, 2020. The full program and additional links are available here: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/events/c...

Watch the Introduction to the Conference:    • Corporations and Democracy Conference...  
Watch Session 1 on Corporations and their Political Voice:    • Corporate Legal Rights and Democracy  
Watch Session 2 on Corporations and Money in Politics:    • Corporations and Money in Politics  
Watch Session 4 on Corporations, Media, and Truth:    • Corporations, Media, and Truth  
Watch Session 5 on Corporations, Corruption and Democracy:    • Corporations, Corruption, and Democracy  
Watch Session 6 on Corporations and the Justice System:    • Corporations and the Justice System