This is my second talk on the Cooperative Game Theory concepts and their applications in power systems research. I elaborate on the properties of coalitional games (such as convexity) and popular solution concepts (the Shapley value and the Nucleolus). Then, I consider the realistic case of cross-border electricity trade in Northeast Asia.
The presentation was prepared as part of the “Energy Systems and Technologies” research seminars, Skoltech, February 2020, Moscow.

00:00 Intro: cooperative game definitions
02:30 Convexity of cooperative games
06:44 The Shapley value, the Nucleolus
08:03 Case: cross-border electricity trade in Northeast Asia
25:12 Manipulations of the Shapley value
30:53 Bilevel optimisation & cooperative games
42:02 Q&A

Andrey Churkin (Андрей Чуркин) 2020
https://andreychurkin.ru/